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31. Introduction1
This paper discusses the economic performance of Latin America in the last decade, paying
special attention to growth and the financial sector.  In particular, it shows that external factors,
such as like U.S. interest rates and the business cycle, play a key role in capital inflows,
investment, and growth.2  As a result, economic growth in the region tends to be fragile and
exhibits a high degree of co-movement, i.e., high cross-country output correlation.  This last
feature exacerbates fragility, because there is little room for mutual insurance within Latin
America in case a country suffers a bad shock, and finance during downturns has to come
primarily from outside the region.
The “Lost Decade” of the 1980s and the recovery of the early 1990s are clear illustrations
of these tendencies.  During the 1980s the slow resolution of the debt crisis kept Latin American
countries outside the international private capital market.  In contrast, the 1990s brought a
dramatic increase in capital inflows that exceeded expectations.  In addition, whenever crises
struck, their negative effect on growth was dramatic.
This paper will provide some clues regarding the big swings in capital inflows.  It will
argue that although these swings are oftentimes triggered by external factors, domestic financial
vulnerabilities could seriously contribute to magnifying them.  Thus, crisis depth is positively
correlated with phenomena like a weak banking sector and large debt amortizations.  However, it
will also be argued that the central capital market has represented an additional source of
disturbance for all Emerging Market Economies (EMs) and  not just Latin America.
The central capital market has been instrumental in intermediating capital inflows to EMs
since 1990. Unfortunately, however, this market was not impervious to shocks.  This became
evident during the Russian crisis in which big players in the central market were subject to a
liquidity crunch, eventually prompting the Federal Reserve Board and the European Central
Bank to lower interest rates.  In the meantime, EM securities suffered a serious slump from
which they have not yet fully recovered.  As a result, EMs, and especially Latin America, have
                                                          
1 The authors would like to thank Laura Dos Reis and Patricia Cortés for their valuable assistance. The views
expressed in this document are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the Inter-American Development
Bank.
2 In a companion paper for this seminar, Calvo, Fernández-Arias, Reinhart and Talvi (2001), we provide estimations
of the joint effect of both external factors on capital inflows and growth of Emerging Markets.
4been facing sharply higher interest rates.  The paper identifies this phenomenon as a key cause of
incomplete growth recovery in Latin America.
The paper is organized in three main sections.  First, we review growth and economic
performance in Latin America over the last 30 years and identify the importance of external
finance in explaining them.  The second section focuses on the novel conditions in external
finance and real economic activity during the past decade, concluding with an analysis of the
current state of affairs in Latin America.  Finally, we close with some remarks on policy in light
of these analyses.
2. Growth in Latin America:  The Importance of External Factors
Perhaps the most salient characteristic of growth performance in Latin America is the remarkable
importance of external factors.  Whether the region regains its growth momentum previous to the
recent downturn—in 1997 Latin American displayed its fastest growth since the early 1970s—
crucially depends on when, if at all, the international environment upset by recent financial
turmoil returns to normal.  The following analysis focuses on this critical factor of growth
performance.3
Common Factors Behind Latin American Performance
Since most external factors affecting Latin America are common across countries in the region
(although an important exception is the price of specific export commodities), the importance of
external factors can be gauged by looking at the common features of the performance of
individual countries.  This approach has been intensively used to analyze financial phenomena in
both quantity and price dimensions.  For example, it was used by Calvo, Leiderman, and
Reinhart (1993), subsequently CLR, to study the role of external factors in the surge of capital
inflows in the early 1990s (quantity), and it was also the methodological basis of Fernández-
Arias and Rigobon (2000), subsequently FR, in their study of international financial contagion in
spreads and returns (prices).  Since financial issues are central to growth in Latin America, in this
                                                          
3 This is not to deny that domestic factors play a key role in Latin American economic growth and that recent
structural reform in Latin America has yielded substantial and sustainable growth dividends (see Fernández-Arias
and Montiel (1997) for research that brings out this conclusion).  However, external factors remain dominant at this
juncture.
5article we will refer to and revisit the analysis in these and related papers as we go along, as well
as open new views on other dimensions.
The evolution of economic growth in Latin America follows a consistent pattern across
countries, which suggests that common factors external to the region are very important for
growth.  The growth rates in individual countries have a very large degree of co-movement, i.e.,
they tend to go up and down together. As a result, the simple average of country growth rates
over time exhibits very ample swings, significantly deviating from the stable growth rate that
would be expected if they were uncorrelated.  The changes in the average growth over time,
shown in Figure 1, are significant and explain a large portion of the variation in growth changes
of individual countries (they reduce or “explain” about one-fourth of the overall variation).  In
fact, this is one major reason why the overall variation of growth rates over time, or growth rate
volatility, is so large in Latin America (see Inter-American Development Bank, 1995).
Figure 1.
Average Growth Rate Fluctuations in Latin America (percentage points)
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If the magnitude of the common external shock is measured by the change in average
growth, it is possible to estimate the proportion of this common impulse that gets transmitted into
6each country’s growth.4  Table 1 shows that countries differ in the degree to which they are
sensitive to external factors, but within a limited range.
Table 1.
Country Sensitivity to Common Factors
Country Sensitivity
Brazil 1.36*
Ecuador 1.21*
Peru 1.11*
Guatemala 1.08*
Bolivia 0.97*
Argentina 0.95*
Venezuela 0.90*
Paraguay 0.88*
Uruguay 0.87*
T & T 0.86*
Costa Rica 0.78*
Dominican Republic 0.75*
Mexico 0.73*
El Salvador 0.71*
Honduras 0.66*
Colombia 0.59*
Chile 0.58
Panama 0.54
Haiti 0.53
Nicaragua 0.25
* Significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence value.
One implication of the importance of external factors for growth performance in Latin
America is that prospects need to be analyzed with an emphasis on the likely evolution of the
external environment, which is the strategy we follow in this document and in our companion
paper, Calvo, Fernández-Arias, Reinhart and Talvi (2001).  However, external does not
necessarily mean exogenous and/or insensitive to domestic policy. First, the degree to which
external factors affect economies depends on domestic policies.  These important policy issues
are discussed in the concluding section of this document.  Second, many important external
financial factors are now under discussion under the rubric of international financial architecture
and are amenable to policy intervention at the international level.
                                                          
4 Strictly speaking, the change in average growth of the rest of the countries.  This may lead to overestimation in the
case of large countries exerting measurable influence on the rest of the countries, which may explain why Brazil
appears as the most sensitive country of all.
7The Importance of External Financing
Growth is closely associated with the magnitude of the net flows of capital into the region (see
Figure 2).  In fact, regional output growth and private net flows, measured as a proportion of
GDP, are positively correlated (34%).  The notorious volatility of these net flows is associated
with the high growth volatility of the region.5   
Figure 2.
 Capital Flows and Growth in Latin America (% of GDP)
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Source: WEO Oct. 2000.
Why is this so?  A large net influx of capital from abroad allows economies to finance
large current account deficits (without depleting limited reserves), and therefore to invest
domestically beyond their national savings.6  The typical macroeconomic outcome is that larger
net flows of capital are associated with larger current account deficits, greater investment and
                                                          
5 The standard deviation of the private net flow series amounts to almost one point of GDP, comparable to its
average level.  However, this relationship should not be necessarily interpreted as a causal relationship; the opposite
direction of causation may predominate.
6 There is, of course, no guarantee that larger investment will be efficiently applied or capacity well utilized,
especially when used to finance public sector deficits, but the association between capital net flows and growth
suggests that this has not been a major problem.
8lower savings.  The observed correlations among these time series, shown in Table 2, bear out
these expected relationships.  (Larger current account deficits are supported by real exchange
rate appreciation.  Usually, the effect of net capital flows on the current account, and hence on
the real exchange rate, is partially offset by variations in international reserves.  An analysis of
these and other macroeconomic relationships can be found in CLR.)
Table 2.
Year Capital Flows (%GDP) GDP Growth Investment (%GDP) Curr. Acc. Bal. (%GDP)
1971 0.86 7.24 19.77 -2.69
1972 0.98 7.37 19.83 -2.14
1973 1.38 8.53 21.80 -1.45
1974 1.85 6.98 24.14 -2.33
1975 1.87 3.02 24.55 -4.53
1976 1.81 5.49 24.25 -3.20
1977 1.66 4.66 24.74 -3.03
1978 2.54 4.63 24.59 -4.07
1979 2.15 6.59 23.34 -3.43
1980 2.87 6.29 23.55 -3.53
1981 3.32 0.86 23.11 -5.17
1982 1.09 -0.69 21.13 -6.36
1983 -0.65 -2.59 18.63 -1.23
1984 -0.14 3.74 18.27 -0.17
1985 -0.16 3.12 19.44 -0.23
1986 -0.03 4.36 19.12 -2.40
1987 0.43 3.35 21.49 -1.16
1988 -0.10 0.96 22.76 -1.02
1989 -0.09 1.49 22.06 -0.45
1990 0.58 0.80 19.77 -0.12
1991 0.87 4.03 19.96 -1.34
1992 2.16 3.56 20.49 -2.31
1993 1.34 4.09 21.25 -2.37
1994 1.41 5.02 21.47 -2.80
1995 1.57 1.71 21.35 -2.20
1996 2.07 3.61 21.18 -2.13
1997 2.04 5.38 22.56 -3.27
1998 1.80 2.18 22.21 -4.49
1999 1.16 0.29 20.10 -3.15
2000 1.29 4.27 20.64 -2.92
Correlation with Net Capital Flows (%GDP) 0.34 0.67 -0.69
Note: Net Private Capital Flows, including capital flights, as % of GDP. GDP in PPP current dollars.
Source: WEO.
Capital Flows and Macroeconomics in Latin America
The previous line of reasoning tells only part of the story.  When access to capital
markets is closed, which happens with distressing frequency in Latin America, the collapse of
9real activity is dramatic.  The collapse caused by a sudden swing in the level of the capital
account, or “sudden stop,” sets in motion a destructive process in the real economy as credit dries
up throughout the economy and production is strangled (see Calvo and Reinhart, 2000a for a
detailed analysis).  The drastic growth slowdown and recession that followed “sudden stops” in
net capital flows (e.g., after the 1982 debt crisis and after the 1998 Russian crisis) are apparent in
Figure 2.  The difference in average growth between years with open access to financial markets
and with closed access to them is more than two percentage points.7
Our econometric analysis, based on pooled information from Latin American country
experiences over the last 30 years on the quantitative relationship between capital flows and
domestic economic activity, confirms the importance of these linkages (see Table 3).  We found
that an increase in private net capital flows of one percentage point in GDP would typically raise
investment almost one for one (86%), thereby depressing savings only slightly, and accelerate
growth by almost half a percentage point (39%).8 Nevertheless, growth in periods of closed
access to external financing is even slower than what the decline in external financing would
account for in this estimation, by about one percentage point.9  (The next section illustrates these
and other relationships in the experience of the last few years.)
Table 3.
External Financing and Economic Activity in Latin America
Dependent Variables
Capital Flows 0.389 0.361 0.864 0.834
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Access to Finance - 0.010 - 0.010
(0.003) (0.004)
* Standard Deviations in parenthesess
Note 1: Estimated using fixed effects. The panel includes 20 countries and 29 years.
Note 2:  Capital Flows are measured as Net Private Capital flows (%GDP) and Access to Finance is a dummy variable taking the
value of 1 for period 75-81 and 90-97 and 0 otherwise.
GDP Growth Rate Investment Rate
Independent Variables
    Note 3: GDP in PPP current dollars.
The availability of external finance also plays a critical role as an insurance device
against adverse economic shocks.  For example, it may allow consumption and investment levels
                                                          
7 Access periods are 1975-1981 and 1990-1997.
8 In this econometric exercise dollar GDP is valued at PPP terms and is therefore less than GDP in nominal dollars.
Therefore the previous results apply to capital flows of about one and one-half points of GDP as customarily
measured.
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to be maintained in the face of natural disasters.  The ability to finance negative shocks to export
prices is also key to maintaining equilibrium in the balance of payments, which may otherwise
be translated into lower investment and growth.  As is well known, Latin America faces very
volatile international terms of trade and export prices (see IDB, 1995 and Figure 3).  The ability
to finance these negative shocks is very important in compensating for the absence of explicit
insurance mechanisms for these key prices and the lack of export diversification in Latin
America.
The worst scenario is when negative external shocks, such as deterioration in commodity
export prices, coincide with lack of access to external financing.  As we will see, this was the
kind of “double whammy” that hit the region in recent years.  The sharp decline in commodity
prices that began with the Asian crises of 1997 combined with the drying-up of external
financing that followed the Russian crisis of 1998 to cause a sharp recession (see Figure 3).
Unfortunately, the convergence of both bad scenarios is not coincidental.  Deteriorating price
conditions worsen country creditworthiness and thus impede access to financial markets.  This
perverse feature of low creditworthiness makes lack of export diversification extremely costly
and heightens the fragility of Latin America’s economic activity.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
9 Investment also shows a similar extra decline in no-access periods but of a much smaller relative magnitude (a
small change in the investment ratio), which suggests that periods of closed access to financing lead to an inefficient
allocation of the scarce finance available.
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Figure 3.
Capital  Flows and Commodity Prices in Latin America
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External Financing: The Role of External Factors
External factors have played a key role in the availability of external financing.  For example,
negative real interest rates in the 1970s set in motion commercial bank lending to Latin America
in the mid-1970s; and high interest rates and recession in the United States precipitated the debt
crisis of 1982.  The surge of capital inflows in the 1990s was no exception, as shown in detail in
CLR.  It is shown there that capital inflows were closely associated with a combination of lower
US interest rates, stock market and real estate returns, and economic activity.
Fernández-Arias (1995) analyzed the channels through which lower international interest
rates contributed to this new wave of capital inflows.  The key insight is that the direct effect that
international interest rates (r) have on the cost of capital (i) in any economy that is financially
integrated into the world is only part of the story, and perhaps not the most important one in
high-risk countries.  In fact, there is also an indirect channel of influence by which international
interest rates affect country creditworthiness, and therefore risk spreads (s) and cost of capital.
This unconventional channel, explained below, was shown to be very important in the period
12
under study.  For completeness, we now add a third, residual channel (x) to capture other sources
of variation, whose nature we will explore in the next section:
i (cost of capital) = r (riskless international interest rate) + s (risk spread)
s = s(d,r,x),  where d is an indebtedness indicator (e.g., debt-to-GDP ratio)
x is an unknown third factor
In this formulation, the risk spread depends not only on traditional debt indicators relating
external liabilities to resource bases (such as exports, GDP, or tax revenue) but also on the level
of international interest rates, so that country creditworthiness also depends on external factors.
In particular, a lower interest rate r leads to a lower spread s and reinforces the direct effect on
cost of capital i, which is further reduced.  The reason for this creditworthiness channel of
transmission is that the country’s capacity to pay depends on the present value of future
resources, which increases as the discount rate declines.  In high-risk countries, i.e., countries
with high risk spreads, this indirect effect may be large and dominate the direct effect.  In this
sense, developing country bonds are like corporate high-risk bonds, whose spreads are very
sensitive to the market value of the firm and could be subject to credit rationing.  As an
illustration, Figure 4 shows the recent decline in Latin American long-term sovereign bond
spreads during January 2001 caused by the US Fed rate reduction of 100 basis points.  As
predicted, the effect on high-spread bonds is larger than on low-spread, investment-grade bonds.
U.S. corporate junk bonds also benefited.  In fact, the Pure High Yield spread index of Bear and
Sterns declined even more over the same period, by about 170 basis points.
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Figure 4.
Changes in Bond Spreads during January 2001 (basis points)
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Source: Bloomberg and own calculations.
Negative shocks to the value of the country’s resource base increase the risk spread and
the cost of capital (thus, s is an increasing function of d).  For example, as mentioned above, a
decline in international terms of trade would have such an effect.  The increase in Latin
American sovereign risk spreads starting in 1997 can be interpreted in this way (see Figure 5).
With the Russian crisis, however, spreads skyrocketed without any measurable change in the
identified variables in the equation above, domestic fundamentals (d) and world interest rate (r).
We therefore attribute this change to the residual unknown x. What is the nature of x?  What
caused this shift in the spread schedule?  We address this question in the next section, but it is
important to point out that the increase in spreads starting in 1998 resulted from a new form of
external factor that will be termed “financial contagion,” which led to the widespread increase in
EM bond spreads.
14
Figure 5.
 Sovereign Bond Spreads in Latin America (basis points)
Latin Eurobond Index (LEI) 1994-2001
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External financing is directly affected by these exogenous financial conditions.  An
increase in the cost of capital leads to less external financing, less investment, and less growth.
If such an increase is based on a large risk spread, a sudden stop occurs.  In turn, less growth
leads to worsening capacity to pay and creditworthiness, which increases risk spreads and
reinforces the increase in the cost of capital.
3. Financial Globalization in the 1990s: A Roller Coaster Ride for
Emerging Markets
We now focus on changing financial conditions and growth performance during the past decade
by examining capital flows in terms of both volume and composition, their price in terms of
bond spread, and economic activity.  As a result of this “roller coaster ride,” bond spreads appear
to have ratcheted up at every turn since the Asian crisis in 1997, casting a long shadow over the
future.  At the same time, economic activity has slowed down and not yet fully recovered in most
countries.
15
The New Wave of Capital Inflows
Latin America saw a strong revival of capital inflows starting in 1990 after a long period of
external financing constraints during the debt crisis of the 1980s. With only a brief interruption
around the Mexican crisis in 1994-95, this resurgence continued to increase until the Russian
crisis in 1998 (see Figure 6).  This phenomenon can be observed with remarkable similarity
across countries in the region (see CLR).  This outbreak was even more pronounced in the rest of
the emerging markets starting in 1989.  The universality of this new wave of capital inflows
suggests that its root cause must lie in developments in central rather than peripheral countries.
Figure 6.
Capital Flows by Region
(billions of 2000 US$)
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This new wave of inflows to the region was not unprecedented.  As shown in Figures 6
and 7, at their peak, similar levels of net capital flows had been observed in 1981, although at
that time they proved to be short-lived and unsustainable.  Interestingly, inflows are also not
unprecedented in the fast-growing Asian crisis countries when capital flows are measured in
relation to the size of the host economies.
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Figure 7.
 Capital Flows (% GDP)
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However, the new wave of capital flows to Latin America in the 1990s exhibited a
different composition.  Its most striking feature was the great importance of previously negligible
portfolio flows, both of debt and equity nature  (see Figure 8).10 At the same time, bank
borrowing was negligible or even negative, in contrast with the experience in other emerging
markets, including the Asian crisis countries (see Figure 9).11   
                                                          
10 However, in the second half of the 1990s, as analyzed below, portfolio flows largely dried up.
11 See Fernández-Arias (2000) for additional analysis of composition changes and contrasts concerning both supply
and demand sides.
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Figure 8.
Portfolio Flows  (%GDP)
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Figure 9.
Commercial Bank Lending   (% GDP)
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FDI exhibits extremely high growth over the decade, but this feature is not specific to
Latin America.  The explosive path that FDI followed in the region in this decade is comparable
to that in emerging markets overall (see Figure 10), and also qualitatively similar to that
observed in industrial countries in the same period.  In recent years FDI has represented almost
100 percent of overall net capital inflows, but this situation is likely to change as conditions for
debt financing normalize (see Hausmann and Fernández-Arias, 2000).
Figure 10.
Foreign Direct Investment (% GDP)
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Why did Latin America experience the new wave of financing of the 1990s?  How can
the observations above be explained?  One clue is given in CLR and subsequent studies, which
show that developments in the center, and especially the decline of US interest rates, bear a very
close association with the surge of capital inflows in Latin America in the period. More
generally, Montiel and Reinhart (1999) confirmed the importance of world interest rates for debt
flows to emerging markets.  Nevertheless, a complete explanation of the experience needs to
account for the fact that Latin America was not considered creditworthy as late as 1989, just
19
prior to the inflow surge.  As Fernández-Arias (1995) pointed out, the expected elimination of
the debt overhang through the Brady plan, designed in 1989, combined with the creditworthiness
“push” provided by subsequent lower interest rates, may have done the trick of devolving
substantial market access to the region.
Still, why is it that Latin America received mainly portfolio flows while other emerging
markets, such as the Asian crisis countries, received mainly bank loans?  Here we venture to
suggest one factor that may have been relevant: the creation of a secondary market for sovereign
bonds in Latin America as a result of the Brady bond exchange.  An unexpected silver lining of
the Brady debt reduction, which mostly focused on Latin America, was the creation for the first
time of a mass of long-term bonds that needed to be managed and traded.  The creation of this
market allowed high-risk portfolios to include Latin American risk and made it worthwhile to
invest in acquiring information about Latin American markets, which ratcheted up investors’
interest in the region once they became familiar with it.12
The Second Half of the 1990s: Financial Crises and Contagion
Another important characteristic of capital inflows in the 1990s was that funds were largely
directed to the private sector (see Fernández-Arias, 2000).  By contrast, in the previous inflow
episode that led to the debt crisis, external financing was mostly directed toward financing public
sector deficits.  Initially, this break with the past was seen as insurance against balance of
payments crises, because it was expected that the corporate sector knew what it was doing.  For
this reason, the Mexican crisis of late 1994 came as a surprise to many.
The new features of the Mexican crisis were linked to the bonded nature of the new
capital inflows.  The refusal of bondholders to roll over short-term public bonds led to Mexico’s
inability to come up with the resources to pay on such short notice.  The key lesson from this
experience was that countries were financially more fragile than previously thought: even if their
long-term capacity to pay was sufficient to cover obligations, they could be rendered insolvent if
a critical mass of investors exited at once.  In this situation, foreign investors could rationally
refuse to lend, and a crisis would ensue.  Thus, liquidity crises were shown to be a distinct
possibility for sovereigns.
                                                          
12 The subsequent creation of secondary bond markets across emerging markets may have diluted this initial
advantage as a portfolio opportunity by contributing to the establishment of an emerging market “investment class.”
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Financial contagion was felt throughout Latin America and beyond in bond spreads and
other financial indicators, and for a period many countries lost market access.  The international
official sector reacted quickly by putting together for the first time a large rescue package.
Financial contagion disappeared in a few months, Mexico adjusted deeply but quickly recovered,
the rescue package was repaid, investors came back, and the episode was brushed aside as an
anomaly.
The second crisis episode was the string of Asian crises of 1997 in Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.  These crises hit some of the high- growth, high-savings
emerging markets considered the best risks at the time.  It became apparent that liquidity crises
were also a possibility in the case of bank lending, whether intermediated through the domestic
banking system or directly allocated to local firms.  Some observers have argued that the Asian
crisis was provoked by the presence of public sector guarantees, strengthened by the Mexican
bailout.  However, the evidence does not support the view that moral hazard played an important
role (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999).  The main lesson, once again, is that liquidity crises are
a real danger and that policy ought to focus on the fragility of the financial system (Calvo and
Fernández-Arias, 2000).
As expected, the Asian crises hit Latin America through trade channels, depressing
export commodity prices.  What was not expected was the significant financial contagion in
bond spreads: the Latin American bond spread index increased by about 200 basis points in
October 1997.  In fact, over half of the jump was recovered over the following few months; by
end-July 1998, just prior to the Russian crisis, it had already returned to its peak level (see Figure
5).
The biggest surprise for Latin America was the aftermath of the Russian default in
August 1998.  Russia is a country with very little real linkage with Latin America, and it
represents less than 1 percent of world output.  And yet, the financial contagion shock wave was
enormous, similar to that felt in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis in 1995.  The Latin American
bond spread index jumped by 700 basis points to more than 1100 points.  The (unweighted)
average spread on long-term bonds of the four largest Latin American economies soared even
higher  (see Figure 11).  The corresponding Loss Equivalent Fraction (LEF), equal to the fraction
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of the contractual value of the bond that would not be expected to be recovered in a fair
contract13 skyrocketed to 60% and has remained consistently above 40%!
Figure 11.
Bond Spreads & Loss Equivalent Fraction (LEF)
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Two other characteristics of contagion are worth noting in order to understand its nature.
First, it was widespread across countries (and regions too), which points to a common factor
beyond the real economy.  For example, witness the sensitivity to contagion of various countries
in the three crisis episodes of the 1990s shown in Figure 12.  Second, while the implied absolute
valuations of spreads are difficult to rationalize in terms of risk of default because they suddenly
become so large, the relative valuations across countries remained unchanged, which suggests
that the market rationally discriminates (see FR).
                                                          
13 The expected present value of the contractual stream of payments that would paid in excess of its nominal value in
the absence of default—and therefore would be expected to be unpaid in a fair contract.
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Figure 12.
 DECREASE IN BOND PRICES (Percent)
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How does one make sense of these facts? The theory most consistent with all the
evidence is that financial contagion was caused by weakness of the financial intermediaries
investing in emerging markets.  In the Russian crisis, accumulated losses and high leverage led
to a liquidity crunch, forcing a sell-off of emerging country paper across the board at fire sale
prices (see Calvo, 1998 for an analysis).  This explanation is consistent with the fact that the
cross-country correlation of bond returns increases during bad times (FR and IMF, 2001).
Furthermore, bond spreads showed a strong tendency to recover prior levels after each
outbreak (see Figure 11 above), as could be expected from a temporary market disequilibrium
offering arbitrage opportunities.  For example, by the end of 1998, only three months after the
worst of the Russian crisis, risk spreads had recovered most of their losses (albeit helped by
generous liquidity policies of industrial countries concerned with the health of their own
financial institutions, such as LTCM).  The Brazilian devaluation of January 1999 was no more
than a brief interruption of this process, which was again underway as early as March. This rapid
recovery pattern was followed closely by individual countries.  Yet, since mid-1999 spreads have
not shown any consistent trend and recovery has not been completed in full.  Similarly, the
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increase in risk spread in the second half of 1997 had not been offset by the time the Russian
crisis hit.  During 2000 spreads showed a general tendency toward deterioration.  In sum,
recovery was fast but limited.
Table 4 shows risk spreads and loss equivalent fractions (LEF) pre-Asian crises, pre-
Russian crisis, and end-January 2001 for long-term sovereign bonds of Latin American
countries.  The table suggests that the developments associated with the Russian crisis and its
aftermath are only half of the story.  The question is what may be behind this ratcheting up of
spreads, relative to the pre-crisis period of 1997, of almost 300 basis points on average for the
big four (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela), which persists even after factoring in the
beneficial effect of US Federal Reserve Board  reductions of its rate by 100 points in January
2001.  For the big four, on average, spreads increased by almost 300 basis points despite having
tightened by 60 basis points in January 2001.  The evolution of spreads in Asian crisis countries
is not as clear due to unavailable information and because the direct effect of the unfolding of
their own crises tends to dominate.  Nevertheless, bond spreads in Asia are consistent with the
same overall pattern.  In particular, they exhibit a parallel deterioration over the course of the
year 2000, shown below in Figure 14.
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Table 4.
Bond Spreads and Loss Equivalent Fraction (LEF)
(1) (2) (3) (2)-(1) (3)-(2) (3)-(1)
Date 30-Sep-97 31-Jul-98 31-Jan-01 Change Change Overall Ch.
LAC
Spreads (bps)
Argentina 332 444 603 112 159 271
Brazil 371 565 673 194 108 302
Colombia 220 426 666 206 240 446
Mexico 296 401 366 105 -35 70
Uruguay 150 189 275 39 86 125
Venezuela 334 794 808 459 15 474
LEF (%)
Argentina 30.5 38.7 46.7 8.2 8.0 16.2
Brazil 34.1 49.2 52.1 15.1 2.9 18.1
Colombia 20.2 37.1 51.6 16.9 14.5 31.4
Mexico 27.2 34.9 28.4 7.8 -6.6 1.2
Uruguay 13.8 16.4 21.3 2.7 4.9 7.5
Venezuela 30.7 69.1 62.6 38.4 -6.5 31.9
ASIA
Spreads (bps)
Indonesia 157 757 712 599 -44 555
Thailand 179 423 141 244 -282 -38
Philipines n.a. 398 539 n.a. 141 n.a.
Korea n.a. 433 212 n.a. -220 n.a.
LEF(%)
Indonesia 10.3 36.3 35.4 26.0 -1.0 25.0
Thailand 11.6 24.2 9.8 12.6 -14.4 -1.8
Philipines n.a. 23.1 29.3 n.a. 6.2 n.a.
Korea n.a. 24.6 14.0 n.a. -10.6 n.a.
Note: Loss Equivalent Fraction (LEF) is the fraction of the contractual present value that would be
expected not to be paid in a fair contract.
               Source: Bloomberg and own calculations.
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On the basis of the spread equation above, in which the bond spread is a function of the
international interest rate and of capacity to pay, as measured by traditional indebtedness
indicators, we first look at the evolution of these two variables as a first attempt at explanation.
Dollar interest rates at all maturities are low by historical standards (see Figure 13).  The increase
of US short-term interest rates during 2000 may have contributed to the increase in bond spreads
in the period, but they are no longer higher than in the pre-crisis period.  Traditional debt
indicators do not appear to explain the deterioration either.  Their small increase in 1998-99 was
brought down to pre-crisis levels by end 2000, which remain low by historical standards (e.g.,
prior to the Mexican crisis and to the new wave of capital inflows in 1990) and are bound to
improve as real activity recovers (Figure 14).  In particular, bond spreads deteriorated as
indebtedness indicators improved during the course of 2000.14
Figure 13.
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14 The indebtedness indices in figure 14 were constructed on the basis of IMF WEO statistics for technical reasons,
due to data availability and comparability over time.  The use of traditional WB-based indebtedness indicators
would reinforce our arguments.
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Figure 14.
Indebtness Indices (end-1990 = 100)
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Therefore our search for an explanation needs to focus on other factors for which the past
is not a good guide—the variable x in the spread equation.  What is the nature of the ratcheting
up of bond spreads?  We now consider three types of explanations based on the reassessment of
the countries’ prospects, on changes in the involvement of the official sector, and on problems in
financial markets.
The most immediate explanation of bond spreads’ ratcheting up is that the market
perceives worse country prospects in Latin America.15  Perhaps it is the expectation of a backlash
of the structural reforms of the 1990s, which did deliver faster growth (Fernández-Arias and
Montiel, 1997) but failed to improve income distribution (IDB, 1999).  Alternatively, perhaps the
growth gains of reform were less long-lived than previously thought and sustainable growth is
being revised downwards.  However, while these hypotheses may have some validity they do not
bode well with the widespread nature of the increase in bond spreads during 2000.  As shown in
Figure 15, it is not only that spreads increased in emerging countries in general, both inside and
                                                          
15 At the outset, it is intuitively difficult to rationalize expected contractual losses of 50%, as shown in the LEF
index in Figure 11, on the basis of the countries’ payments records.
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outside Latin America, but also that they increased substantially in the US corporate high-yield
segment.  This evidence suggests that some of the important underlying forces are unrelated to
any reassessment of countries’ prospects.
Figure 15.
High-Yield Bond Spreads Compared (basis points)
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Alternatively, the issue of how the official sector involves itself in financial crises in EMs
may be at the root of the increase in bond spreads.  One such explanation was born after IMF
refused to rescue Russia and its default caused substantial losses to investors.  This loss has been
mentioned as a good reason why the market reassessed the risk of default in all other emerging
markets, anticipating that they might not be rescued in the future.  This argument is usually made
in reference to the elimination of the moral hazard that official rescue packages would have
provided before the Russian crisis, but such a linkage is unnecessary.  Justified or not, less
official support at time of crises, either because of a change in policy or because the necessary
economic and political resources erode over time, implies higher private risk (for a given
country’s fundamentals).  A variant of this explanation, upon which the private sector places
substantial weight, is that the unpredictability of the rules of engagement of the official sector,
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more than their change, creates fear of an unnecessary or abusive private sector bail-in (private
sector involvement, or PSI) and drives up the perception of risk.
This set of explanations rings true and could account for the widespread deterioration in
financial conditions in EMs, but, again, cannot account for the increase in junk bond spreads or
other related phenomena in industrial countries, which we analyze below.  Furthermore, the
extent to which it can be sustained in light of the actual experience of official intervention is
uncertain. Even under the pessimistic expectation that the official sector will not be able to make
its role more effective in the international financial architecture it is trying to design, the official
sector has at least shown its readiness and ability to support fast recovery when economic
fundamentals are satisfactory, as in Mexico or Korea.  It is true that some of the perceptions of
the new doctrine of PSI may have scared the market at times, but the emergency packages of
Brazil and Argentina should have gone a long way toward counteracting such impressions.
Finally, there are explanations grounded in problems with financial markets.  Country
risk, or the probability of default, may have been reassessed simply because we have observed
new and unexpected situations that may lead to crisis.  For example, as explained above,
liquidity crises may appear more likely now.  The implication is that the imputed probability of
default conditional on given economic fundamentals would be revised upwards, thus leading to
an apparently unjustified increase in spreads.  Under this interpretation, financial globalization
entails more risk than meets the eye under solvency considerations only, and traditional
solvency-based creditworthiness indicators ought to be replaced by more comprehensive
indicators encompassing overall financial fragility (see Calvo and Fernández-Arias, 2000).
The collapse in bond prices due to international financial contagion is another mechanism
by which bond spreads may increase for given countries’ fundamentals.  Even under the
assumption that the phenomenon is temporary and the probability of default remains unaffected,
bondholders anticipating the need to sell in bad times will demand higher spreads in return.
Emerging country paper is extremely illiquid in bad times and consequently entails large capital
losses to those forced to sell, which increases the market cost of country default and further
distorts the traditional relationship between solvency indicators and spreads.
The large variability and correlation among EM bond returns could also be a reason for a
negative market reassessment of the portfolio value of these bonds to risk-averse investors.
Higher spreads may have resulted not from considerations of default but from portfolio risks
29
associated with lower diversification value, which would imply that country spreads and LEFs
depend not only on country default probabilities but also on how a country’s bond returns
fluctuate in relation to those in other markets.  In fact, returns are highly correlated across
countries in all emerging markets and even with junk bonds in industrial countries (see Figure
15), which diminishes the portfolio value of emerging market bonds and demands a higher
spread for any given default probability.  The same is true with the correlation between bond
returns in Latin America and the US NASDAQ stock index, which supports the view that all
high yield investments, including US stocks, belong to the same class (see Figure 16).  In fact, it
is tempting to think that investors specialized in high yield investments contaminate all high
yield markets through contagion in the very attempt to hedge through diversification. The end
result is to kill diversity.
Figure 16.
Latin American Bonds and US Nasdaq
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It is not clear, however, that the cross-country correlation of bond returns is higher now
than it was before the Asian and the Russian crises (IMF, 2001), and therefore this factor would
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not contribute directly to explaining the increase in spreads over time that we are analyzing. The
same holds true in connection with NASDAQ in Figure 16.  Nevertheless, the correlations
involving EM bond returns increase in bad times (FR, IMF, 2001).  If more crises are expected in
the future, correlation considerations, like liquidity considerations analyzed above, would
reinforce the increase in spreads.
Real Activity and Investment
The roller coaster behavior of capital flows and financial market conditions were reflected in a
similar roller coaster behavior of the real economy in Latin America. This is illustrated in Figure
17, which shows annualized quarterly growth rates of  (seasonally adjusted) GDP for the simple
average of the seven major countries in Latin America, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
Figure 17.
GDP Cycle in Latin America
(Annualized quarterly growth rate, s.a.)
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Recovery
Three very clear phases in real economic activity emerge from Figure 17. First, an output
growth deceleration phase (1997-III/1998-II) in the aftermath of the Asian crisis and prior to the
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Russian crisis; second, a recession phase (1998-III/1999-II) in the aftermath of the Russian crisis;
third, a recovery phase (since 1999-III) after the Brazilian devaluation did not develop into a full-
blown crisis (thanks in part to the international support that was absent in the case of Russia) and
financial conditions started to normalize in mid-1999.
Table 5.
GDP Cycle in Latin America (Year on Year growth rate)
II-97 vs II-96 II-98 vs II-97 II-99 vs II –98
(1) (2) (3) (3) - (1)
Venezuela 8.7% 2.0% -7.4% -16.1%
Argentina 8.1% 6.7% -5.2% -13.2%
Colombia 3.4% 1.7% -6.8% -10.2%
Chile 6.1% 6.3% -3.7% -9.8%
Peru 7.8% -3.0% 2.1% -5.7%
Mexico 8.4% 4.2% 3.1% -5.2%
Brazil 4.7% 1.6% -0.1% -4.8%
Average 6.7% 2.8% -2.6% -9.3%
Source: Central Bank and own calculations.
The deceleration-recession phase implied a huge turnaround in output growth rates
starting in the third quarter of 1997.  This turnaround was broad-based and highly synchronized
and it affected, without exception, the seven major Latin American economies. Table 5 shows
the year on year GDP growth rates for each country in the 12-month period prior to the Asian
crisis (1996-II/1997-II) and in the deceleration and recession phases described above. In the two-
year period between the second quarter of 1997 and the second quarter of 1999, growth rates
declined in every single country (going from positive to negative with the exception of Mexico
and Peru) falling on average by 9 percentage points. The decline ranged from 5 to 6 percentage
points in Brazil, Mexico and Peru to 10 percentage points in Chile and Colombia, 13 percentage
points in Argentina and 16 percentage points in Venezuela.
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Table 6.
Business Cycle Analysis of the 1998-99 Recession: GDP (s.a.quarterly data)
RECESSION PHASE
Peak Trough Length Size
Venezu
ela
1998.I 1999.III 6 -9.3%
Colomb
ia
1998.II 1999.II 4 -6.8%
Argenti
na
1998.II 1999.II 4 -4.8%
Chile 1998.II 1999.I 3 -3.6%
Brazil 1998.II 1998.IV 2 -2.1%
Peru 1997.III 1999.I 6 -2.0%
Mexico No recession phase
Averag
e
4.2 -4.8%
Source: Central Banks and own calculations.
The high synchronization of the business cycle among the seven major Latin American
economies is even more striking when we use quarterly, seasonally adjusted GDP data in order
to perform a business cycle analysis to identify peaks and troughs in economic activity. Table 6
shows that economic activity, as measured by GDP, peaked by the second quarter of 1998 (i.e.,
prior to the Russian crisis) in every country with the exception of Mexico (where output growth
rates decelerated significantly but did not actually fall).
The recession that followed had an average duration of four quarters and output fell by an
average of 5 percent.16 Peru and Brazil experienced relatively mild declines (2 percent) while
Venezuela and Colombia were the most severely affected, with output declines of 9 percent and
7 percent, respectively. Argentina, with an output decline of 5 percent and Chile, at 4 percent,
were in the middle of the pack.17
                                                          
16 For our purposes a recession is defined as two consecutive quarters of decline in GDP.  The size of a recession is
measured by the cumulative decline in output from peak to trough.
17 It is interesting to note that the 1998-99 recession cycle was not particularly deep when compared to the recession
cycle that followed the Mexican devaluation in December 1994, but it was broader and more persistent. The average
decline of output from peak to trough during the current recession cycle was 4.8 percent, (compared to 5 percent
during the 1995 recession cycle) but the duration was twice as large (four quarters vs. two quarters).
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Table 6 also shows that the recovery phase was highly synchronized and centered on the
third quarter of 1999.18 The recovery process, however, has not been particularly strong. In spite
of the fact that the recovery phase has now been running for an average of five quarters, as of the
third quarter of 2000, only Peru, Brazil and Chile have fully recovered the output levels
prevailing prior to the outbreak of the recession phase. Output levels in Argentina, Colombia and
Venezuela are still below their previous peak.
Moreover, a closer look at Figure 17 also suggests that the recovery process is showing
some signs of weakness. The simple average of the annualized quarterly growth rates of GDP
appears to be stalling in the second and third quarter of 2000. Although we should expect growth
rates to settle at lower levels once the economy comes out of recession and unutilized capacity is
exhausted, current average growth rates are very unsatisfactory both in absolute terms and when
compared to those prevailing prior to the Asian crisis.
Looking more specifically at individual countries, quarterly growth rates decelerated
substantially in Chile, Mexico and Venezuela since the fourth quarter of 1999 while in Argentina
and Peru the recovery actually faltered and output started to fall again in the second and third
quarters of 2000, respectively. Brazil appears to be the only country where a noticeable
deceleration in economic activity is not yet apparent.19
                                                          
18 For our purposes a recovery is defined as two consecutive quarters of increase in GDP.
19 Colombia’s quarterly GDP growth rates  have been recently very erratic to be able to detect a  declining pattern.
However, industrial production growth rates decelerated significantly in the third quarter of 2000.
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Figure 18.
Investment Cycle in Latin America
(Annualized quarterly growth rate, s.a.)
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Investment, a crucial variable for the future growth prospects of the region, displayed a
pattern very similar to that of GDP, namely, a deceleration-recession-phase followed by a
(relatively weak) recovery phase as illustrated in Figure 18.
Table 7.
Investment Cycle in Latin America (Year on year growth rate)
II-97 vs II-96 II-98 vs II-97 II-99 vs II –98
(1) (2) (3) (3) - (1)
Colombia -2.1% 1.9% -43.5% -41.4%
Argentina 19.4% 10.4% -16.9% -36.2%
Chile 8.6% 13.1% -18.9% -27.5%
Peru 12.6% 3.8% -14.8% -27.4%
Venezuela 8.3% 9.4% -13.5% -21.8%
Mexico 25.2% 10.6% 6.1% -19.1%
Brazil 7.8% 4.0% -5.1% -12.9%
Average 11.4% 7.6% -15.2% -26.6%
Source: Central Banks and own calculations.
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The turnaround in investment growth rates during the deceleration-recession phase was
even larger than that of GDP. As Table 7 illustrates, in the two years from the second quarter of
1997 to the second quarter of 1999 the decline in investment growth rates was on average 27
percentage points (three times the turnaround in GDP growth rates) going from positive to
negative in every single country except Mexico (where investment growth decelerated
significantly but never actually fell). The major turnarounds were Colombia (41.4%), Argentina
(36.3%), Peru and Chile (27.5%).
Table 8.
Business Cycle Analysis of the 1998-99 Recession: Investment
 (s.a. quarterly data)
RECESSION PHASE
Peak Trough Length Size
Colombia 1997.IV 1999.II 6 -47.3%
Chile 1998.I 1999.IV 7 -24.6%
Venezuela 1998.I 1999.III 6 -20.1%
Peru 1997.IV 1999.II 6 -17.5%
Argentina 1998.II 1999.II 4 -16.6%
Brazil 1998.I 1999.III 6 -3.9%
Mexico No recession phase
Average 5.8 -21.7%
The business cycle analysis of investment behavior is presented in Table 8.  Again the
behavior of investment shows a high synchronization, peaking in every country at approximately
the same time although, in general, prior to GDP. The average decline in investment was 22%
(ranging from 5% in Brazil to 47% in Colombia) and the average duration of the investment
recession was 6 quarters (two quarters longer than GDP).20
The recovery phase of investment was also highly synchronized and started in the third
quarter of 1999. However, only Brazil is close to full recovery of the investment levels
prevailing prior to the beginning of the recession. In the rest of the countries, investment levels
                                                          
20 The duration of the investment recession was twice as large as the one that followed the Tequila crisis.
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remain well below their previous peak: 12% in Venezuela, 17% in Chile, 25% in Argentina, 26%
in Peru and 35% in Colombia. 21
This behavior of investment is consistent with the substantial increase in bond spreads
(the ratcheting effect described in the previous section) that followed the Russian crisis. The
deterioration in external financial conditions may have led to a downward revision in the desired
degree of leverage on the part of firms, leading to a potentially protracted period of relatively
low levels of investment as firms adjust their balance sheets to the new situation. As we point out
in the next section, governments ought to seriously consider precisely this policy of reducing
their debt levels in the face of extraordinarily high levels of interest rates.
4. Economic Policy Issues: What Can Be Done to Brighten the Future?
There is a yawning gap between developed and Latin American countries in terms of output per
capita, income distribution and poverty indexes.  This is a source of concern but, at the same
time, a source of hope.  As argued by Parente and Prescott (2000), growth miracles occur in
countries that start from a relatively backward stage.  Their very backwardness represents a
window of opportunity.  The challenge is thus to find effective ways of removing the barriers to
growth.
The present paper has shown that output performance in Latin America is closely linked
to external variables.  This does not deny the existence of deep-seated, slow-moving, local issues
that keep the region from replicating successful growth experiences in other parts of the world,
but it suggests that, given those, external factors are an important determinant of growth.
Consequently, many of the potentially most effective policy actions to promote Latin American
growth are concerned with reforming the international financial architecture.22  In this respect,
the “bad news” is that there is little individual EMs can do to change the international
environment.  Such policy actions, which exceed the scope of this paper, require difficult
multilateral coordination. However, the “good news” is that how this environment impacts on an
individual country depends, to some extent, on domestic policy, an issue that will be explored
next.
                                                          
21 Investment actually fell in the first three quarters of 2000 in Argentina and the second and third quarter of 2000 in
Peru.
22 See for example Fernandez-Arias and Hausmann (2000a, 2000b).
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To begin with, notice that the impact of financial crises is a function of the level of
indebtedness and capital-inflow dependency.  A country with no debt and no current account
deficit, for example, is unlikely to be seriously hurt by international financial turmoil.23  Absence
of debt is not an objective worth heeding, especially for countries that want to traverse the
yawning gap.  However, this example helps to highlight the risks associated with indebtedness in
a volatile international financial environment.  It is not enough to follow a sustainable fiscal
policy that ensures convergence of the debt/GDP ratio to, say, 30 or 40 percent.  Other
considerations also count.
One key consideration is the sudden-stop potential of outstanding debt.  If all debt
matures overnight, for example, creditors could demand immediate repayment.  Under those
conditions, any debt level is potentially too large.  Thus, debt maturity takes center stage.
Maturity should be managed in such a way that the country would, most of the time, be able to
meet its net debt obligations, i.e., net of credit lines that could be activated in case old creditors
refuse to roll over their credits at reasonable interest rates (this is related to the Guidotti-
Greenspan proposal; see Guidotti, 2000).  However, as shown above, several countries in the
region face extraordinarily high interest rates on their long-term debt.  Thus, this maturity
management strategy might not be feasible or, at least, could be excessively costly.  Thus, the
lesson for policymakers: follow a tight fiscal policy that would lower the public sector debt/GDP
ratio to levels where the maturity strategy has an acceptable cost.
Still, the above public debt reduction policy may be ineffective in lowering country-
specific interest rates if the private sector is vulnerable to a sudden stop.  In that case, the
government may have to become a net creditor in order to be able to support the private sector in
case of a sudden stop. However, political support for the policy would wane very rapidly once
the non-debtors realize that the government is raising taxes to, in the end, bail out debtors.
Behavior does not happen in a vacuum.  Most likely private sector exposure to sudden
stops is in part due to the expectation of bailouts by the public sector.  Thus, an important part of
the maturity management strategy should be a decoupling of private and public sectors in order
to avoid confusion and surprises as to how the burden is assigned when difficulties arise.  The
key is that private and public debts are kept separate: private does not become public through an
                                                          
23 However, as shown in Fernández-Arias and Hausmann (2000a and 2000b), FDI liabilities also pose a risk, albeit
smaller.  Furthermore, if difficulties are grounded in domestic factors, capital outflows by nationals may lead to
financial collapse even with no debt.
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after-the-fact bail-out at the expense of taxpayers and, equally important, public does not become
private through a fiscal surprise (through higher taxes, for example).
Banks are an important source of the mutation of private into public debt because  central
banks are typically willing to bail out banks for the sake of preserving the payments system.
Thus, decoupling is difficult here.  Announcements that the central bank will refrain from bailing
out the banking system are hard to believe.  Thus, the central bank should take preventive action.
For example, it could pursue policies that prevent banks from taking undue risks.  One such
policy is imposing high liquidity requirements, i.e., the share of deposits that has to be held in
highly liquid assets such as international reserves.  Another is to set limits to central bank credit.
Central bank independence is not enough.  Independence guarantees that the central bank will
not be subservient to the fisc, but it does not ensure that it will not be the pliant servant of the
financial sector.  During crises the latter has proven to be a more demanding master than the
former.  This is due in part to the fact that refusing to bail out the banking sector is very
unpopular with the general public.  It forces banks to repudiate bank deposits, whose official
guarantees may be less than fully credible, and creates havoc in the payment system.
What about controls on short-term capital inflows?  Empirical evidence shows that this
kind of policy has a negligible effect on total capital flows, but it affects the maturity of
international indebtedness (see Calvo and Reinhart, 2000a, for a summary of empirical results).
Thus, prima facie this seems a good strategy for ameliorating sudden stops.  However, this is at
best a partial solution.  International debt is only one component of total (gross) debt; the other is
debt among domestic residents, particularly bank loans and deposits.  Thus, the maturity of total
gross debt may not change.  Lengthening the international component could lead to shortening
the maturity of the domestic component.  In fact, such a change in composition could help
explain why controls on capital mobility appear to have such a small macroeconomic impact.24
Furthermore, an often heard complaint is that these types of controls discriminate in favor of
multinationals, given that the latter can easily cover up short-term loans through distorted
transfer prices (i.e., prices charged for transactions between headquarters and the local
subsidiary) and profit remittances.
None of the above considerations has referred to the exchange rate regime and they thus
equally apply to all such regimes.  Experience shows, however, that exchange rate management
                                                          
24 Another explanation, of course, is that the financial sector can bypass those controls.
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plays an important role.  The profession is far from agreeing on the best regime for EMs.
However, there is wide consensus that soft pegs are very risky, especially when the peg is not in
line with the fiscal stance.  There is also clear empirical evidence that policymakers do not like a
regime of free floating exchange rates (a fact labeled “fear of floating” by Calvo and Reinhart,
2000b).  Thus, in practice the two serious contenders at present are hard pegs, like Currency
Boards (as in Argentina and  Hong Kong) and Inflation Targeting, or IT (as in Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico).  Both are, in a sense, pegs because instead of letting the exchange rate freely
take its course, they target the market value of the currency.  A narrow band for target inflation
approximates a hard peg.  A hard peg targets currency value in terms of a foreign currency or
basket of currencies, while IT does so in terms of a basket of goods.  Notice, incidentally, that if
the only good in the basket were a foreign currency, IT is equivalent to fixed exchange rates.
Which system dominates is still a hotly debated issue.  However, it is clear that the choice must
be dictated by the characteristics of the domestic financial system, pass-through coefficients, and
credibility (see Calvo and Reinhart, 2000c).  In particular, Liability Dollarization, i.e., the
existence of debts denominated in foreign exchange, poses a serious constraint for the choice of
target.25  In a heavily liability-dollarized system a devaluation, for example, could trigger
financial distress.
                                                          
25  Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) have called this phenomenon “Original Sin.”  See Hausmann, Panizza and
Stein (2000) for a discussion.
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